

# A New Approach to Securing Audio Conference Tools

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## ABSTRACT

Instead of securing the communication channel between sources and destinations as in today's Internet, Named Data Networking (NDN), a recently proposed Internet architecture, is designed to secure data directly. To further understand the design space of securing applications through securing data, we performed a case study of designing the security mechanisms for the Audio Conference Tool (ACT). Utilizing NDN's built-in primitive of signed data packets, we applied basic cryptographic schemes in a straightforward manner to effectively secure conferencing control information as well as voice data.

## Categories and Subject Descriptors

C.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Security and protection

## General Terms

Security

## Keywords

Named Data Networking, Data Security, Distributed Design

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The Named Data Networking (NDN) [11] is a newly proposed Internet architecture. NDN treats data, instead of hosts, as the first-class entity, and secures data directly instead of securing communication channels as current Internet protocols such as SSL/TLS [3] and IPSec [8] do. As a case study to address the question of exactly *how* to materialize this vision, in this paper we

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describe the security design for the Audio Conference Tool (ACT), which is one of the pilot applications that are developed to run over NDN.

Contrary to conventional approaches to securing audio conferences which heavily rely on centralized controllers, ACT is a completely distributed design and we achieve source authentication, participant control, and private conferencing through simple applications of public key cryptography in the absence of a central controller. As described in [11], NDN distinguishes the *use* of public keys, i.e. encryption and signature verification, and *trust management*, which provides an infrastructure for users to validate and verify the public keys. NDN assumes that each party is associated with one or multiple keys and each application uses those keys to secure data. Trust management, on the other hand, is not confined within specific applications, and is subject to different policies by different people and different organizations. Therefore, trust management can and should be provided as separate and independent component. Assuming the trust relationship is established, conference participants and data flows in ACT are managed through the use of public keys, rather than by setting up sessions from the central controller.

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief background of NDN and ACT. In Section 3, we define the security requirements for ACT while in Section 4 discuss how ACT satisfies such requirements. Our results are discussed in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.

## 2. BACKGROUND

### 2.1 Named Data Networking (NDN)

Entities in NDN [7] identify and retrieve content using data names, and communication is driven by the receiving end, i.e., the data consumer. To receive data, a consumer sends out an *Interest* packet, which carries a name that identifies the desired data.

A router remembers the interface from which the request comes in, and then forwards the Interest packet by looking up the name in its *Forwarding Information*

*Base (FIB)*, which is populated by routing protocols that propagate name prefixes instead of IP prefixes. If more than one Interest packets are received that carry the same data name, the router simply remembers their arrival interfaces. Once the Interest packet reaches a node with the requested data, the *Data* packet  $D$  is sent back.  $D$  carries the name and the data, together with a signature created by the original data producer that binds together the name and the data. As a result of the state that was set up by the Interest packets at the intermediate routers,  $D$  traces the reverse paths back to all the data consumers that have requested the data. Each router along the way may also cache the Data packets in order to answer the later requests for the same data. Such automatic caching is enabled by NDN’s design of securing the data in each packet, which decouples trust in data from trust in the nodes. Consumers can verify data packets’ validity independent from where they come from.

## 2.2 Audio Conference Tool

ACT [12] is one of the pilot applications to explore the naming and security designs on NDN. Instead of relying on centralized services as current implementations do, ACT takes a named data approach to discover conferences and speakers, and to fetch voice data from individual speakers. ACT users send Interest packets to collect the latest information about scheduled and ongoing conferences, which need to be propagated across the network. Thus ACT chooses names for conference information data from a broadcast name space.

As an example, an ACT user on the NDN testbed sends an Interest for the name `/ndn/broadcast /conference /conference-list`. Anyone announcing a conference should reply to this Interest with a Data packet with the conference information using the *Session Description Protocol (SDP)* [5] format, including estimated starting time, media type supported, etc. The name of the data is constructed by appending a unique conference name component to the name carried in the Interest packet. Each ACT user keeps an outstanding Interest for conference discovery, so that new or updated conference data can be fetched as soon as they are generated.

If a user wants to join an ongoing conference, the next step is to collect the information of all active speakers so that the user can send Interest packets to retrieve their voice data. Speaker discovery of a particular conference is done in a way similar to conference discovery, i.e. each user sends a broadcast Interest that can reach all the active speakers in that conference, then each speaker sends a speaker description data packet in reply. The speaker description data includes the speaker’s topology-dependent name prefix used for voice data, the codec and rate of the audio stream, among other infor-

mation. Once a user acquires the information for the speakers, he/she can receive the voice data by sending Interests directly towards each of them.

## 3. ACT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

ACT can be used in a variety of conference scenarios, each may have somewhat different security requirements. ACT is designed to provide the following security guarantees:

- *Data Authenticity*: Conference participants must be able to verify that each piece of audio data is generated by the intended source, as indicated on the data packet. This level of security is required by all conference, from public meetings open to anyone (e.g. IETF meetings) to private conference calls.
- *Participant Control*: Some conferences require the ability to control the list of participants. We call users who are not part of the conference as “outsiders”. Outsiders must not be prevented from listening or injecting voice data into existing conferences.
- *Anonymity*: Private conferences require the ability to hide the participants list to outsiders, who must not be able to learn who may be participating in a private conference.

We show how ACT fulfills these requirements in the next section.

## 4. SECURING ACT

We call the user who creates a conference its “Organizer”. We assume that Organizer knows the identity of all users who are allowed to join the conference it creates. Organizer is the only entity with the permission to change the conference description, to add or remove participants and to devise and enforce the participant control policies. ACT security design makes the following two assumptions:

- A trust management system, which allows applications to determine the validity of the public keys, is provided by the underlying NDN layer or by some other mechanism (see e.g. [4, 10, 9]).
- Participants are assumed to follow the protocol faithfully but may try to learn additional information from their interaction with other users. We make no assumptions on the behavior of a former participant once he leaves a conference.

The rest of this section illustrates the supporting mechanisms to meet the ACT security requirements as described in Section 3.

### 4.1 Data Authenticity

ACT security utilizes NDN’s basic security primitive

for data authentication. All NDN data packets, hence all ACT data packets, are digitally signed, and the name in each data packet is cryptographically bound to the corresponding packet content. When speakers are not hidden from public, this ensures both the integrity and authenticity of each packet. In case of private conferences, data authenticity issues are discussed in Section 4.4.

## 4.2 Participant Control

ACT employs an encryption-based access control scheme that allows only the eligible participants to decrypt the information about the conferences.

For a conference that requires participant control, its **Organizer** generates a public/private key pair  $(K_e, K_d)$  to distribute confidential information within the conference, where  $K_e$  is used for encryption while  $K_d$  is used for decryption. Conference information is encrypted by **Organizer** using  $K_e$  and can only be accessed by those who obtain  $K_d$ .

**Organizer** keeps the encryption key secret and distributes the decryption key  $K_d$  to all legitimate participants in encrypted form to prevent outsiders from accessing it. All encryptions of  $K_d$  (one per participant) are included in a single data packet. Although doing so increases the packet size, it allows a better utilization of the multicast and caching capabilities built in NDN. The hash values of the eligible participants' public keys are also included together with the encrypted  $K_d$ . In this way, each user can determine whether he/she is among the legitimate participants without performing any decryption.

Only **Organizer**, who knows  $K_e$ , can further update the conference information or alter participant control policies. Thus the underlying encryption scheme must prevent users with the knowledge of  $K_d$  to determine the value of  $K_e$ . This can be achieved using RSA-OAEP [2]. In particular, given  $N = p \cdot q$  where  $p$  and  $q$  are safe primes, in our instantiation the encryption exponent  $e$  (only known to **Organizer**) is chosen uniformly at random from all the values  $1 < e < \phi(N)$  such that  $e$  is co-prime with respect to  $\phi(N)$ . Unfortunately, this does not allow us to adopt some of the common optimizations related to RSA. It is not possible to select an exponent  $e$  with low hamming weight, since participants would be able to determine its value based on the knowledge of  $N$ . Moreover, since the knowledge of  $p$  and  $q$  allows any party to compute the  $e$  from the decryption exponent  $d$ , only **Organizer** can use CRT to perform RSA operations.

## 4.3 Voice Data Encryption

Voice data in a conference call is much higher in volume compared to conference announcement data. Moreover, while there is only one **Organizer** for each

conference, there are likely multiple speakers; in a small conference perhaps all participants speak at some time. Therefore the asymmetric encryption approach used in securing conference data becomes infeasible for securing voice data, mainly due to two reasons. First, according to the protocol above, each speaker has to generate a key pair  $(K_e^s, K_d^s)$  and distribute  $K_d^s$  to all listeners. This requires each speaker to have complete knowledge of the other participants in the conference, which may not be the case. Besides, letting each speaker distribute a private key also incurs significant overhead. Second, asymmetric encryption imposes higher computation overhead compared to symmetric encryption. Doing asymmetric encryption for each voice data packet raises concerns about the computation overhead, especially on devices with limited resources (e.g. smart phones, tablets).

Based on the above consideration, ACT uses symmetric keys for voice data encryption. **Organizer** establishes the key for voice data, and participants use the same key to decrypt data from speakers and encrypt their own packets.

## 4.4 Participant Identity Protection

Some conferences may wish to keep the participants' identities hidden from outsiders. In particular, outsiders should not be able to tell who is participating in a given conference. In these cases, the hash values of the participants' public keys, which are used to help identify legitimate participants, will not be included in the conference announcement data packet. Moreover,  $K_d$  must be encrypted using a key-private encryption scheme [1], so that observers cannot determine the identity of participants' public key by observing an encrypted conference announcement.

Furthermore, speakers should also generate a temporary asymmetric key pair for signing speaker information data, so that the signatures in the NDN packets will not reveal their identities. Speakers must include signatures that guarantee the authenticity of their voice data encrypted together with the speaker information data using the symmetric keys of the conference.

Although a topology-dependent prefix inevitably reveals the location of a user, a third party cannot distinguish voice data packets from other packets due to encryption. Therefore, no external adversary can tell which names are used in ACT for audio streams. In order to achieve better anonymity, users may also use NDN anonymizing techniques to access and publish conference data.

## 4.5 Key Revocation

Key revocations can be used to force selected participants to leave a conference. Key revocation is straightforward in ACT. As ACT keeps an outstanding Interest

for new or updated conference description [12], Organizer can generate a new announcement at any time for the key revocation. All the participants that are still eligible for the conference will fetch the updated keys immediately.

In order to distribute a new asymmetric key pair for a conference, Organizer uses the current  $K_e$  to encrypt the conference announcement, which indicates the asymmetric key revocation and includes normal conference information encrypted with a new key  $K'_e$ .  $K_e$  is used to encrypt the data so that the participants are assured that the key revocation is legitimate, as the conference Organizer is the only one who knows  $K_e$ . The recipients then check whether they are still allowed to participate and, if they are, successfully decrypt  $K'_d$ .

To issue a new symmetric key, which supersedes the current one, Organizer simply includes the new key in the conference announcement.

## 5. DISCUSSIONS

### 5.1 Secret Participants List

As mentioned in the previous sections, there are some circumstances in which concealing the identity of participants is desirable. In our current design, this simple difference in requirements leads to significant changes in the processing overhead of conference participant discovery. Because no information about the participants can be disclosed in public, the design described in Section 4.4 forces all the recipients to go through a trial-and-error process of decrypting each encrypted  $K_d$  in order to determine whether they are eligible to join the conference. This process can lead to serious scalability concerns as all the users within the conference broadcast scope have to spend their computational power to determine their eligibility for a conference, and a large conference would have a long list of encrypted  $K_d$  list. A possible solution to this issue is the use of broadcast encryption [6] for large conferences with secret participants lists. This allows participants to determine whether they are allowed to join the conference by performing one single decryption. However, we consider the cost related to broadcast too high compared to the approach described above for conferences with less than a few hundreds participants.

### 5.2 Use of Symmetric Keys

The use of symmetric key encryption instead of public key encryption eliminates the need for every speaker to distribute a decryption key to all conference participants, which introduces a non-negligible overhead. It also alleviates the computational cost of encrypting and decrypting data. On the other hand, symmetric keys have a critical limitation: due to their symmetric nature, they do not enforce any distinction between data producers and consumers. Any user, given the right

to decrypt, can also encrypt data using the same symmetric key. In multi-party communications, symmetric keys should be used with caution as an engineering optimization, rather than the primary tool. We use symmetric keys for voice data encryption to reduce the computational burden of ACT based on the assumption that every participant has the permission to speak and participants are semi-honest, i.e., they will not impersonate each other. The fact that it is usually possible to distinguish or recognize people by their voice also adds another reason for choosing symmetric keys for such purpose.

## 6. CONCLUSION

In this paper we presented the design of the security mechanisms for ACT, a distributed audio conference tool over NDN. This design uses only simple cryptographic tools, but represents a fundamental departure from conventional approaches which rely on centralized controllers and session-based security. Through directly securing data rather than its containers and the separation between the use of public keys and trust management which verifies the keys, our design meets the security requirements in a distributed way and enables each conference group to devise and enforce their own security policies.

We hope the work reported in this paper can serve as an illustrative example to show how one may benefit from NDN's basic machinery of securing data directly to develop secure applications in a simple and straight forward way.

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